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INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTION RATE IN EUROPEAN BANKING INDUSTRY

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ABSTRACT

The debate on the significance of the social security is as old as social security itself. The recent significance shrink between the cost and income of the social security is an alarming situation for all the stakeholders. The shrinking in social security surplus reduces the government and firm's ability to rely on that surplus. This shortfall will lead to made up increased taxation, borrowings, or by reductions of social security contributions or combination of these alternatives. We analyzed the relationship of social security contribution and employment growth in the European banking over the time span of 2006 to 2015. We found the U shaped relationship, as increase in the social security contribution cost more to the banks which leads downsizing. Meanwhile social security payments boost the economy as the People who receive Social Security benefits are not saving that money for a rainy day. They pumped it back to the economy by purchasing goods and services. The businesses that receive that spending in the form of selling goods and services realize profits and hire more employees. This is what exactly we find the U shaped relationship for the European banking industry. So social security has multiplier effect on the economy, businesses and workers.

Keyword: Social Security, Taxation and stakeholders.

INTRODUCTION

Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced the concept of the social security by signing the social security Act on Aug. 14, 1935. It's all about the social insurance system with an idea that if workers pooled a portion of their wages, they would be able to protect their families against wage loss due to retirement. Through this national benefits program, Social Security made available a basic level of monthly income to workers who paid into the system.

Approximately fifty six million people enjoy social security benefits, with the retired workers that are dominated with sixty nine percent following by disabled persons or their children about nineteen percent and twelve percent being survivors of deceased workers.

Due to the multiplier effects of the social security, it is a strong need to critically check on the

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social security system and Laws. In the literature there is much more noise about the solvency of the social security, so this is the time to take proactive measures for the better management of the social security.

The economic theory suggests that the firms are willing to compensate workers equal to the value of their productivity. This compensation can be any form but for the employer total cost does mater. It might be cash benefits, non cash benefits as per the policies of the firms and workers desire. Workers prefer a portion of their total compensation to be paid in the form of pension benefits because their net compensation is enhanced by the favorable tax treatment of pensions

Firms contribute in the social security programs because of two reasons depending upon the circumstances of the country. More commonly first firms are legally bond to contribute in the social security in the form of insurance, pension which they supposed to contribute at all cost. The second motivation behind offering such contributions by the firms is to attract, retain and eventually retire the quality workers.

If deferred compensation yields greater total value to workers, firms with pension plans will find it easier to employ quality workers. There is another reason to maintain the pension scheme is to offer higher incentives to workers to adjust the retirement timing as per the human resource need.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

It has been widely argued that lower social contributions leads higher job turnover. To overcome this issue many firms designed very healthy social security system to retain and attract the talented people. Robert L. Clark (1999) explained that firms want to retain the talented workers so they offer them much compensation. They also argued that firms invest lot of money on the training of the employees and they do not want to lose all their invested money and if it happens they could not survive in this competitive world.

As it has been argued that pension contribution influence the dividends and investment opportunities for the firms. Weixi Liu and Ian Tonks investigate the influence of the pension contribution on the dividends policies and investment policies for the UK-listed firms. Using a sample of DB pension schemes in FTSE350 UK-listed firms, they concluded that there is negative influence of pension contribution on the dividends and investment policies of the firms. This ultimately leads to decrease in the financial performance of the firms as the higher contribution in the pension schemes creates financial pressure on the firms. To overcome this pressure firms raise external capital which is expensive and higher contribution in the pension fund also reduce the internal capital available for the investments and pay the dividends.

Similarly Bunn and Trivedi (2005) investigate the relationship between the pension contribution and dividend payout ratio of the UK listed firms and cite the significant negative relationship. In addition Rauh (2006) came with the same conclusion that there is negative relationship between the pension contribution and investments opportunities but he adds that this might be true for the firms which are voluntary contributing to the pension fund and also argues that this happens because of the financial constraints.

The lack of invest funds and lower the dividend payout ratio later creates the agency problem between the shareholders and pension holders. Cocoa and Volpin (2007) find that firms that are more leveraged firms and majority of pension trustee are the insiders they are tend to invest more the equities. On the other hand Rauh (2009) argued that firms with poorly funded pension plans are more likely to invest in the risk free securities like government bonds and cash. Franzoni

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(2009) examines the reaction of the stock prices to the mandatory pension contribution and he concludes that there is a sharp fall in the stock prices of the firms which had the financial constrains.

The success of the businesses dependent upon the market share but in this competitive world generate reasonable and sufficient market share is not a piece of cake. For attracting more customers, firms need to provide high quality products and high quality services which are not possible without quality workers Fevang et al. (2014). Without satisfying the employee's needs, they could not provide quality products and services before their most valued employee take their talents to competitors. Employee can afford to give an employer more commitment and loyalty when the company finds a way to give them more financial security Lu et al. (2010) and Yao and Zhong (2013).

As social security contribution is an expense for the firm, at start it attracts more talents to the company which definitely benefit the firm in the form of good products and services, meanwhile to afford these talents cost a lot for the firms. This article is an effort to examine this relationship for the European countries. As European countries do have sound labor laws and bond the firms to pay the social security for the employee. The following section describes the research methodology and data section.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) has been used for the European banking sector. We utilize the data of social contribution rate and the number of employees and also expansion of business in terms of the number of branches. The study covers the time span of ten years for the 2006 to 2015. We utilize the quadratic regression model to examine the relationship between the social contribution rates and number of employee's .Through this model; we are assuming that the increase in the social contribution has double influence on the employees. We employ the same model for individual countries too.

4 Results and Discussion

Table 1- describes the descriptive statistics of the country wise social security contribution rate and number of employees in the banking industry of the European countries

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Table 1: Descriptive of Social Security in European Countries

Spain								
SSR		Employee						
Mean	21.9946	Mean	4.552E+10					
Standard Error	1.16836392	Standard Error	9075573959					
Median	23.8645	Median	5.7027E+10					
Standard Deviation	3.694691122	Standard Deviation	2.8699E+10					
Kurtosis	-1.827862307	Kurtosis	-1.269002					
Skewness	-0.320883104	Skewness	-0.8459392					
Range	9.927	Range	6.856E+10					
Minimum	16.773	Minimum	4802341559					
Maximum	26.7	Maximum	7.3362E+10					
Count	10	Count	10					

Spain									
SSR		Employee							
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Standard

	Poland						Slovak Republic						
	SSR			Emp	loyee			SSR			Employee		
	Mean	17.5	17.5807		Mean			Mean Standard Error Median	17.1533	3	Mean	294266124.1	
	Standard	0.59236828 17.0185		Standard Error Median Standard							Standard		
	Error					381622			0.4790	74	Error Median	67573295.25	
	Median					1.7452			17.186	17.1865		389984465	
	Standard					d		Standard			Standard		
	Deviation	1.87	3232978	Deviation Kurtosis		1.2068		Deviation Kurtosis	n 1.5149	1.514966 -0.288225	Deviation	213685522	
	Kurtosis	-0.64	45141176			-2.3619			-0.2882		Kurtosis	- 2.002230564	
	Skewness	0.77	8774181	Skew	vness	0.0904	1014	Skewnes	s -0.0954	485	Skewness Range Minimum Maximum	- 0.247029301	
	Range	5.35		Rang	ge	2.758E	+10	Range Minimum Maximum	4.882	4.882 14.758 19.64		522379957.8 52852298.19 575232256	
	Minimum	15.6	5	Mini	mum	679825	57431		n 14.758				
	Maximum	21		Max	imum	3.4378	E+10		n 19.64				
	Count	10		Count		10		Count	10		Count	10	
	Poland	<u></u>					Slovak Republic			•			
	SSR			Employee			SSR			Employee			
	Mean	17.5807		•	Mean		E+10	Mean	17.153	17.1533	Mean	294266124.1	
	Standard				lard			Standard			Standard		
	Error	0.59236828		Error		381622	25253	Error	0.479074		67573295.25		
	Median	17.0	185	Median				Median	17.186	17.1865	Median	389984465	
	Standard			Stand	lard			Standard		1.514966		213685522 - 2.002230564	
	Deviation	1.87	3232978	Devi	ation	1.2068	E+10	Deviation	n 1.5149				
	Kurtosis	-0.64	45141176	Kurt	osis	-2.3619	9737	Kurtosis	-0.2882	225			
	Skewness	0.77	8774181	Skew	vness	0.0904	1014	Skewnes	-0.095485 4.882	Skewness Range Minimum Maximum	- 0.247029301 522379957.8		
	Range	5.35		Rang	ge	2.758E	+10	Range					
	Minimum	15.65 21		Mini	mum	679825	57431	Minimur				52852298.19	
	Maximum			Max	imum	3.4378	E+10	Maximu				575232256	
	Count	10		Cour	Count			Count	10		Count	10	
d							Italy						
		Employee 18.1875 Mean		e		SSR				Employee			
	18.1875					06825	Mean				Mean	841530795	
ard Error	1.1172112	63	Standard]				Standa	ard Error	0.84967	S	Standard Erro		
ın	19.8315		Median		13786		Media	n	24.5315	I	Median	1.15529E+	
1	1		0 1 1	~		G. 1	1						

Deviation	3.532932218	Deviation	670291639	Deviation	2.686893	Deviation	51938533061
Kurtosis	-1.897562677	Kurtosis	-1.3309251	Kurtosis	-1.592049	Kurtosis	-1.225266146
Skewness	-0.43495129	Skewness	-0.8251297	Skewness	0.142881	Skewness	-1.033239081
Range	9.021	Range	1592795210	Range	7.2	Range	1.09526E+11
Minimum	12.979	Minimum	155531759	Minimum	20.8	Minimum	8878429065
Maximum	22	Maximum	1748326969	Maximum	28	Maximum	1.18405E+11
Count	10	Count	10	Count	10	Count	10

Standard

Standard

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Standard

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Finland						Germany					
SSR Employee						SSR		Employee			
Mean		22.0256	Mean	2936030560	2936030560		Mean		Mean	3.50789E+11	
Standard En	ror	0.950220293	S Standard Erro	or 533521855	533521855		or	0.333444	Standard Erro	or 65558881086	
Median		22.4095	Median	3479984068	3479984068		Median		Median	4.21688E+11	
Standard			Standard			Standard			Standard		
Deviation		3.004860403	B Deviation	1687144243	3	Deviation		1.054442	2 Deviation	2.07315E+11	
Kurtosis		-1.61885335	8 Kurtosis	-1.4141832	-1.4141832		Kurtosis		1 Kurtosis	- 1.108210066	
Skewness		-9.9748E-05	Skewness	-0.7233314		Skewness		-0.19039		- 0.913846476	
Range		8.45	Range	3989348147	7	Range		3.117	Range	4.98873E+11	
Minimum		18.05	Minimum	589397006		Minimum		23.883	Minimum	29801008246	
Maximum		26.5	Maximum	4578745153	3 Maximum			27	Maximum	5.28674E+11	
Count		10	Count	10	10		Count		Count	10	
Czech Reput	blic				Est	tonia					
SSR Emp		Employee	mployee		SSR			Employee			
Mean	18	.8278	Mean	1303892449	Me	ean	13.5193		Mean	47098800.41	
Standard Error	0.5	553371039	Standard Error	261553846	Sta	Standard Error		720075	Standard Error	14571789.1	
Median	19	.013	Median	1585812317	Me	/Iedian 1		3.925	Median	35893778.5	
Standard			Standard		Sta				Standard		
Deviation		749912874	Deviation	827105883	De	Deviation 2		277077	Deviation	46080043.15	
Kurtosis	-0.	927402904	Kurtosis	-1.1334002	Ku	rtosis (645703	Kurtosis	0.685265952	
Skewness		225108291	Skewness	-0.5468831	Sk	ewness	-1	.104895	Skewness	1.279776477	
Range	5.2		Range	2263004472		nge			Range	137509570	
Minimum	16	.469	Minimum	171431128	Mi	nimum	9.06		Minimum	1596030.198	
Maximum	21	.75	Maximum	2434435600	Ma	aximum	16	5.228	Maximum	139105600.2	
Count	10		Count	10	0 Co		10)	Count	10	

On average the social security contribution rate in the Belgium is the maximum which is 25.77 percent and on the other hand the minimum social contribution rate is observed in the Mexico which is 8.29 percent. More interestingly the more variations in the social security contribution rate come in the Spain as evident by standard deviation of 3.6946 having the average social contribution rate is 21.99 percent. The main reason behind this high contribution rate is the extensive social security system. Foreigners also are entitled to certain allowances and to social services.

In Belgium employers are supposed to contribute in the social security up to 40.58% of the gross salary for blue-collar employees and approximately 34.58% of the gross salary of white-collar employees. Companies with fewer than 20 employees pay slightly less. Under the 2015 "Tax shift agreement" the maximum effective contribution rate will be lowered to 30% on 1st April 2016 and to 25% on 1st January 2018. The social contribution is due on the gross salary. The social security

contributions also pay the firm in the form of tax saving as its deductible business expenses for corporate income tax purpose. On one hand it is good for the employees and for the government as a source of the revenue on the other hand its benefit for the firm

to save the tax for the firms. Firms can enjoy the lower tax and employee's loyalty by providing the financial benefits for the firms.





Figure 3- U shape graphical trend of Italy, Netherland and Poland

The social security contribution rate in Italy is quite impressive which is on average 42.99 percent. This is quite higher as compared to the Finland which considered among the advanced social security system in the world. The employees are being contributed in the social contribution is about 10% while a significant contribution comes from the employer which is 25 percent of the employee salary. The contribution rate in Italy varies across the industries and as per the benefit received. Netherland social security system is also well established system which bound all the employees and employers to contribute in the social security system. On average employees contribute more than the employer in Netherland. The Polish social security system made up of three pillars, to which payments are made. The First one which is obligatory Pay-as-you-go principal administrated by the state while the second one which is also obligatory common capital managed by the private entities and the third which is voluntary managed by the private entities. The employer contribution in Poland is higher than employees that is 23.19 percent and 13.71 percent respectively. From this comparison

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the Italy social security system is quite sound.



Figure 3- U shape graphical trend Spain

The Spanish social security system consists of contribution and non-contribution system. According to the contribution system a general scheme applicable to all employed persons who are not covered by special schemes, plus certain categories of civil servants. In non contribution system, persons who face a specific situation of need, and whose income is below certain legally prescribed level, are eligible for non-contributory benefits. They may be entitled to this even if they have never paid social security contributions, or have done so but are not entitled to the resulting benefits under the contributory system.

CONCLUSION

No doubt the social security system throughout the Europe is quite sound and its getting improving day by day. But there is a still complicated area of EU law regarding the coordination of social security among all the members. The member states have always closely guarded their competences in this area, thus resulting in a complex patchwork of highly different systems of social security across the member states. Experts divided the whole system into three systems named Bismarkian, Beveridgian system and Nordic. According to the Bismarkian, contributions are similar to the insurance based regimes, whereas Beveridgian system based on a mix of need and residence with some types of benefits having a contribution element. The Nordic system is all about the universal rights, qualified on residence in the territory and decoupled from contributions and employment record. For the time being the most important and critical area for the Europe is the coordination of social security programs among the member states. Although significant progress has been made but there is still need to sit together and resolve the diverse social security issues among the member states.

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