
COMMUNITY SECURITY, VIGILANTISM, AND STATE RESPONSE IN UROMI, NIGERIA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF MOB JUSTICE

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ABSTRACT

Mob justice remains a major public administration and governance challenge in Nigeria, reflecting weaknesses in formal security and justice institutions. This study examines the determinants of mob justice in Uromi, Edo State, focusing on community security structures, trust in state institutions, and state response mechanisms. It is anchored on Social Contract Theory and Procedural Justice Theory, which explain how institutional legitimacy and perceived fairness influence compliance with formal legal systems. A quantitative cross-sectional survey design was employed, involving 400 adult residents selected through stratified random sampling. Data were collected using structured questionnaires and analyzed using descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis. The results show that community vigilante presence has a significant positive effect on mob justice ($\beta = 0.48$, $t = 8.00$, $p < 0.001$), while neighborhood watch effectiveness reduces mob justice ($\beta = -0.22$, $t = -4.40$, $p = 0.001$), with an explanatory power of $R^2 = 0.52$. Trust in the police ($\beta = -0.55$, $t = -7.85$, $p < 0.001$) and judiciary ($\beta = -0.41$, $t = -6.83$, $p < 0.001$) significantly reduce mob justice, explaining 61% of variation ($R^2 = 0.61$). Similarly, police response time increases mob justice ($\beta = 0.44$, $t = 8.80$, $p < 0.001$), while prosecution effectiveness reduces it ($\beta = -0.38$, $t = -6.33$, $p < 0.001$), with $R^2 = 0.57$. The study concludes that mob justice is strongly linked to governance deficits, institutional inefficiency, and weak public trust, rather than isolated criminal behavior. It reflects a breakdown in public administration effectiveness and the social contract between the state and citizens. The study recommends strengthening community policing, improving judicial efficiency, regulating vigilante groups, enhancing accountability, and promoting civic education to reinforce rule-of-law compliance.

Keywords: Public Administration, Mob Justice, Institutional Trust, Community Policing, Governance, Nigeria, Uromi.

1. INTRODUCTION

Mob justice, commonly defined as the extrajudicial punishment of suspected offenders by a group of people, has become a persistent feature of Nigeria's justice landscape. Rather than being isolated incidents, it reflects deeper structural problems in the country's security and justice systems. In many communities, citizens increasingly rely on self-help measures because they perceive formal institutions—especially the police and courts—as ineffective, slow, or corrupt (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2005; Aborisade & Fayemi, 2021). This growing reliance on informal justice suggests a weakening of the state's authority and its ability to maintain law and order. Researches has shown that public trust in law enforcement plays a critical role in shaping how citizens respond to crime.

When people believe that the police are fair, responsive, and effective, they are more likely to follow legal procedures. However, when trust is low, citizens are more inclined to support or participate in alternative forms of justice, including mob action (Akinlabi, 2017; Tankebe, 2013). In Nigeria, repeated experiences of delayed investigations, alleged corruption, and poor case handling have contributed to this loss of trust. As a result, mob justice is often seen by some community members as a quicker and more effective way to deal with suspected offenders, even though it violates the rule of law (Olaniyan & Okeke-Uzodike, 2022).

At the community level, informal security groups such as vigilante organizations and neighborhood watch associations have emerged to fill the gaps left by formal policing systems. These groups sometimes help reduce crime, especially in areas with limited police presence. However, their activities are often not well regulated, which increases the risk of abuse and excessive use of force (Baker, 2002; Aborisade, 2023). Without proper oversight, these groups may rely on suspicion, rumors, or profiling when dealing with suspects, which can easily lead to mob violence. This situation creates a complex environment where efforts to improve security may unintentionally contribute to unlawful practices.

Recent events in Uromi, Edo State, highlight the seriousness of this issue. Reports of mob attacks, including the killing of suspected kidnappers, bandits and other criminals based on unverified claims, show how quickly community responses can turn violent in the absence of effective state intervention. These incidents are often linked to fears of kidnapping and other crimes, which have increased in many parts of Nigeria. In such situations, local vigilante groups and residents sometimes take immediate action without waiting for the police, especially when they believe that official responses will be delayed or ineffective. This pattern reflects broader national trends, where mob justice continues to occur in communities facing security challenges and limited access to timely law enforcement.

The persistence of mob justice raises important questions about governance and the relationship between the state and its citizens. Social contract theory suggests that citizens expect the state to provide security and justice, and when the state fails in this responsibility, people may resort to self-help measures. Similarly, procedural justice theory emphasizes that people are more likely to obey the law when they perceive legal authorities as fair and trustworthy (Tyler, 2006). When these conditions are not met, the legitimacy of the state is weakened, and informal systems of justice become more acceptable. In this sense, mob justice can be understood not simply as criminal behavior, but as a response to institutional failure.

Although there is a growing body of research on vigilantism and informal justice in Nigeria, much of it focuses on national or regional patterns (Adisa, 2022; Aborisade, & Fayemi, 2021; Aborisade, 2023). This leaves a gap in understanding how these issues play out at the community level, where local conditions and experiences can shape people's attitudes and actions. Uromi provides an important case for examining these dynamics because of its recent experiences with mob violence and its reliance on community-based security arrangements. Studying this location allows for a more detailed understanding of how factors such as trust in institutions, the presence of vigilante groups, and the effectiveness of state response influence the occurrence of mob justice. This study therefore seeks to examine the determinants of mob justice in Uromi, Edo State, with a focus on community security structures, trust in state institutions, and state response mechanisms. By combining insights from social contract theory and procedural justice theory, the study aims to provide a clearer explanation of why mob justice persists and what can be done to address it. In

doing so, it contributes to ongoing discussions on security, governance, and the role of the state in maintaining justice in Nigeria.

2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL REVIEW

2.1 Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored in Social Contract Theory and Procedural Justice Theory, both of which provide complementary explanations for the persistence of mob justice in contexts of weak governance. Social contract theory posits that the legitimacy of the state is fundamentally tied to its capacity to provide security, enforce laws, and deliver justice. Classical theorists such as Thomas Hobbes argue that individuals surrender certain freedoms to the state in exchange for protection and order. When the state fails to fulfill this obligation, citizens may revert to self-help mechanisms as a rational means of survival (Levi & Stoker, 2023). In contemporary contexts like Nigeria, this breakdown of the social contract manifests in the proliferation of vigilantism and mob justice, where communities assume the role of both judge and enforcer. Thus, mob justice can be interpreted not merely as lawlessness but as an alternative form of order arising from institutional failure.

Procedural justice theory complements this perspective by focusing on how citizens perceive the fairness and legitimacy of legal authorities. According to Tom R. Tyler, individuals are more likely to comply with the law when they believe that legal processes are fair, transparent, and consistently applied (Tyler, 2006). Conversely, when law enforcement agencies are perceived as corrupt, biased, or ineffective, public trust declines, and compliance weakens. In such situations, citizens are more likely to justify extrajudicial measures, including mob justice, as acceptable alternatives. Together, these theories suggest that mob justice emerges at the intersection of state failure (institutional weakness) and perceived injustice (legitimacy deficit).

2.2 Empirical Review

Empirical studies across Nigeria and other developing contexts consistently demonstrate a strong relationship between weak state institutions and the rise of vigilantism and mob justice. In Nigeria, Aborisade (2023) shows that experiences of police brutality and corruption significantly erode public trust, thereby increasing citizens' willingness to support informal justice systems. Similarly, Akinlabi (2017) finds that perceptions of police legitimacy are a key predictor of public compliance with the law; where legitimacy is low, citizens are more inclined to endorse self-help justice. These findings directly support procedural justice theory by demonstrating how perceived unfairness in law enforcement drives alternative forms of justice.

Beyond perceptions, structural inefficiencies within the criminal justice system also play a critical role. Alemika and Chukwuma (2005) argue that mob justice in Nigeria is often rationalized as a practical response to systemic failures such as delayed investigations, low conviction rates, and inadequate policing. This position is supported by more recent studies showing that communities with high crime rates and limited police presence—such as parts of Lagos and southeastern Nigeria—report higher incidences of mob violence (Okeke & Nwankwo, 2024). These patterns reinforce the central claim of social contract theory: when the state is unable to guarantee security, citizens seek alternative mechanisms to protect themselves.

At the community level, the rise of vigilante groups further illustrates the interaction between institutional failure and local adaptation. Baker (2002) notes that vigilante organizations in Nigeria often emerge as community-driven responses to insecurity, particularly in areas where formal

policing is absent or ineffective. However, while these groups may initially serve protective functions, they frequently evolve into unregulated actors capable of perpetrating violence. This dual role reflects a broader tension identified in the literature: informal security arrangements can both complement and undermine state authority (Meagher, 2007). In many cases, the absence of legal oversight allows these groups to operate based on suspicion, rumor, or collective sentiment, increasing the likelihood of mob justice.

Comparative evidence from other African countries strengthens these conclusions. Tankebe (2013) demonstrates that in Ghana, public trust in the police significantly shapes citizens' willingness to cooperate with law enforcement, while low trust encourages support for vigilantism. Similar patterns have been observed in Kenya, where vigilante groups function as parallel governance structures in areas with weak state presence (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003). These findings highlight that the relationship between institutional weakness and informal justice is not unique to Nigeria but reflects a broader governance challenge across sub-Saharan Africa.

Globally, the link between institutional trust and mob justice has also been widely documented. Rosenbaum (2001) pointed that vigilantism and collective violence tend to increase in societies where legal institutions are perceived as ineffective or inaccessible. In Latin America, for example, studies have shown that communities facing high levels of crime and weak judicial systems often resort to lynching as a form of immediate justice (Godoy, 2006). These global patterns reinforce the theoretical argument that mob justice is a predictable outcome of governance deficits rather than an isolated cultural phenomenon.

Synthesizing these empirical insights with the theoretical framework, it becomes clear that mob justice is driven by both structural conditions and perceptual factors. Structural conditions—such as weak policing capacity, slow judicial processes, and inadequate state presence—create the environment in which mob justice becomes possible. At the same time, perceptual factors—particularly low trust in legal institutions and perceived injustice—shape citizens' willingness to engage in or support such actions. This dual explanation aligns with both social contract theory and procedural justice theory, providing a comprehensive framework for understanding the persistence of mob justice in contexts like Uromi. Consequently, any meaningful intervention must address not only institutional capacity but also public perceptions of legitimacy and fairness.

3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the relationship between community security structures and the occurrence of mob justice in Uromi?
2. How does trust in state security agencies influence the prevalence of mob justice?
3. What is the effect of state response mechanisms on the persistence of mob justice?

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 Research Design

This study adopts a quantitative cross-sectional survey design to examine the determinants of mob justice in Uromi, Edo State, Nigeria. The cross-sectional approach allows for the systematic collection of standardized data from a large number of respondents at a single point in time, making it suitable for identifying patterns, relationships, and predictive effects among variables such as community security structures, institutional trust, and state response mechanisms. This design is widely used in social science research where the objective is to explain behavioral tendencies and

perceptions within a defined population (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). It is particularly appropriate for this study because mob justice is a socially embedded phenomenon that can be effectively analyzed through population-based perceptions and experiences.

4.2 Study Area and Population

The study was conducted in Uromi, located in Esan North-East Local Government Area of Edo State, Nigeria. Uromi is a semi-urban community characterized by a mix of formal and informal security arrangements, including the presence of vigilante groups and limited police coverage. In recent years, the area has experienced increasing concerns related to insecurity, including incidents of mob justice, making it a relevant context for this investigation. The target population comprises all adult residents (18 years and above) living in Uromi. Based on projections from the National Population Commission and local administrative estimates, Uromi is estimated to have a population of approximately 150,000–180,000 residents, of which about 55–60% are adults, yielding an estimated adult population of roughly 85,000–100,000 individuals. This estimate is consistent with demographic trends in semi-urban Nigerian communities where a significant proportion of the population falls within the adult age bracket. The focus on adult residents is justified on both methodological and substantive grounds. Methodologically, adults are more capable of providing informed and reliable responses on issues relating to security, trust, and justice. Substantively, they are more likely to have direct or indirect experiences with law enforcement agencies, community security structures, and incidents of mob justice. Therefore, they constitute the most appropriate population for examining the determinants of mob justice in the study area.

4.3 Sample Size Determination

The sample size for the study was determined using **Cochran's (1977) formula** for large populations, which provides a statistically robust method for estimating representative samples. The formula is given as follows:

$$n = \frac{Z^2 p(1 - p)}{e^2}$$

Where: n = required sample size, Z = standard normal deviation at 95% confidence level (1.96), p = estimated proportion of the population with the attribute (0.5 assumed for maximum variability) and e = margin of error (0.05). Using this formula, a minimum sample size of 384 was obtained. To enhance the reliability of the analysis and account for potential non-response or incomplete questionnaires, the sample size was increased to 400 respondents. This sample size is considered adequate for regression analysis and ensures sufficient statistical power to detect significant relationships among the study variables.

4.4 Sampling Technique

A stratified random sampling technique was employed to ensure that the sample adequately represents the diverse segments of the population in Uromi. The study area was first divided into its administrative or political wards, which served as strata. This stratification was necessary to capture potential variations in security experiences and perceptions across different parts of the community. Within each stratum, respondents were selected using simple random sampling, ensuring that every eligible adult had an equal probability of being included in the study. The number of respondents selected from each ward was determined proportionately based on estimated population distribution. This approach enhances the representativeness of the sample,

reduces sampling bias, and improves the generalizability of the findings to the broader population (Kothari, 2004).

4.5 Instrumentation and Measures

Data for the study were collected using a structured questionnaire developed from existing literature on procedural justice, institutional trust, and community security. The instrument was designed to capture both demographic information and key study variables in a clear and systematic manner. The questionnaire was organized into four sections covering demographic characteristics, community security structures, trust in state institutions, and perceptions of mob justice. All major constructs were measured using five-point Likert scale items, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), allowing for quantitative analysis of attitudes and perceptions. Community security structures were measured through items assessing the presence, effectiveness, and operational behavior of vigilante groups and neighborhood watch systems. Trust in state institutions was captured through respondents' perceptions of police integrity, fairness, responsiveness, and the effectiveness of the judiciary. State response mechanisms were assessed using indicators such as police response time, investigation efficiency, and prosecution outcomes. The dependent variable, mob justice, was measured through respondents' attitudes toward, and perceived justification of, extrajudicial actions. This operationalization ensures that the constructs are aligned with established theoretical frameworks and empirical studies.

4.6 Validity and Reliability of Instrument

To ensure content validity, the questionnaire items were carefully developed based on established constructs in prior studies and reviewed by experts in criminology and social science research. This process ensured that the instrument adequately captured the concepts it was intended to measure. A pilot study was conducted using a small sample outside the study area to test the clarity and reliability of the instrument. Internal consistency was assessed using Cronbach's alpha, and all scales recorded values above the acceptable threshold of 0.70, indicating satisfactory reliability (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). These procedures enhance the credibility and robustness of the data collected.

4.7 Data Collection Procedure

Data were collected through the face-to-face administration of questionnaires by trained research assistants. This approach was adopted to improve response rates, ensure proper understanding of the questions, and minimize missing data. Respondents were approached in various locations, including residential areas and public spaces, across the selected wards. Ethical standards were strictly observed throughout the data collection process. Participation was voluntary, and respondents were assured of the confidentiality and anonymity of their responses. Informed consent was obtained before participation, and respondents were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time without any consequences.

4.9 Data Analysis Techniques

To test the study hypotheses and examine the relationships among variables, multiple regression analysis was employed. This technique is appropriate for assessing the predictive influence of multiple independent variables on a single dependent variable (Field, 2013). The level of statistical significance was set at $p < 0.05$, and all analyses were conducted using statistical software to ensure accuracy and reliability of results.

5. RESULTS

Research Question 1: What is the relationship between community security structures and the occurrence of mob justice in Uromi?

Table 1: Regression Results for Community Security Structures and Mob Justice

Variable	Coefficient (β)	Std. Error	t-value	p-value	Remark
Community Vigilante Presence	0.48	0.06	8.00	0.000	Significant (+)
Neighborhood Watch Effectiveness	-0.22	0.05	-4.40	0.001	Significant (-)
Constant	1.35	0.30	4.50	0.000	Significant
R² = 0.52					

The regression results in Table 1 show that community security structures jointly explain a substantial proportion of variation in mob justice in Uromi, with an R^2 value of 0.52. This implies that 52% of the changes in mob justice can be attributed to variations in vigilante presence and neighborhood watch effectiveness. The model is statistically significant overall, indicating a strong explanatory power of community-based security arrangements on mob justice dynamics. Individually, community vigilante presence has a positive and statistically significant effect ($\beta = 0.48$, $p < 0.05$), meaning that increased reliance on vigilante groups is associated with higher occurrences of mob justice. This suggests that while vigilantes are intended to enhance security, their informal and often unregulated operations may escalate punitive actions. Conversely, neighborhood watch effectiveness shows a negative and significant relationship ($\beta = -0.22$, $p < 0.05$), indicating that structured and organized community surveillance systems reduce the likelihood of mob justice by promoting preventive rather than punitive security responses.

Research Question 2: How does trust in state security agencies influence the prevalence of mob justice?

Table 2: Regression Results for Trust in State Institutions and Mob Justice

Variable	Coefficient (β)	Std. Error	t-value	p-value	Remark
Trust in Police	-0.55	0.07	-7.85	0.000	Significant (-)
Trust in Judiciary	-0.41	0.06	-6.83	0.000	Significant (-)
Constant	2.10	0.40	5.25	0.000	Significant
R² = 0.61					

Table 2 indicates that trust in state security institutions explains a significant proportion of variation in mob justice, with an R^2 value of 0.61, meaning that 61% of changes in mob justice are explained by trust in the police and judiciary. This high explanatory power suggests that institutional trust is a central factor in shaping public responses to crime and justice in Uromi. The individual coefficients show that trust in the police has a strong negative effect on mob justice ($\beta = -0.55$, $p < 0.05$), indicating that higher trust in police reduces the likelihood of mob action. Similarly, trust in the judiciary also has a significant negative effect ($\beta = -0.41$, $p < 0.05$), meaning that confidence in court systems discourages extrajudicial behavior. The negative signs of both

variables confirm that stronger institutional legitimacy reduces reliance on informal and violent justice mechanisms.

Research Question 3: What is the effect of state response mechanisms on the persistence of mob justice?

Table 3: Regression Results for State Response Mechanisms and Mob Justice

Variable	Coefficient (β)	Std. Error	t-value	p-value	Remark
Police Response Time	0.44	0.05	8.80	0.000	Significant (+)
Prosecution Effectiveness	-0.38	0.06	-6.33	0.000	Significant (-)
Constant	1.80	0.35	5.14	0.000	Significant
R² = 0.57					

The results in Table 3 show that state response mechanisms explain a significant portion of variation in mob justice, with an R² value of 0.57, indicating that 57% of the changes in mob justice are accounted for by police response time and prosecution effectiveness. This suggests that the efficiency of formal justice responses plays a critical role in shaping community behavior toward crime. The findings further reveal that police response time has a positive and significant effect on mob justice ($\beta = 0.44$, $p < 0.05$), meaning that delays in police intervention increase the likelihood of mob action. This reflects public frustration with slow emergency response systems. In contrast, prosecution effectiveness has a negative and significant effect ($\beta = -0.38$, $p < 0.05$), indicating that when offenders are effectively prosecuted, the tendency for communities to engage in mob justice decreases. This demonstrates that effective legal consequences strengthen confidence in formal justice systems and discourage extrajudicial actions.

6. DISCUSSION

The findings of this study provide strong evidence that mob justice in Uromi is shaped by institutional weaknesses within the formal security and justice systems. In particular, delays in police response, weak prosecution effectiveness, and low public trust in law enforcement were found to significantly increase the likelihood of mob justice. These results align with Olaniyan and Okeke-Uzodike (2022), who argue that in contexts of state fragility, citizens often shift from formal legal systems to informal and self-help justice mechanisms due to institutional failure. However, the literature is not entirely one-directional. While several studies emphasize institutional weakness as a driver of vigilantism and mob justice (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2005; Aborisade, 2023), other scholars caution against reducing the phenomenon solely to state failure. For instance, Meagher (2007) argues that informal security arrangements in Nigeria are also shaped by local power relations, social norms, and community networks, which can sometimes operate independently of state capacity. Similarly, Tankebe (2013) suggests that legitimacy is not only determined by institutional performance but also by social expectations and moral alignment between citizens and authorities. This indicates that mob justice may also be influenced by community-level moral perceptions of crime and punishment, not just institutional inefficiency. From a theoretical standpoint, the findings strongly support social contract theory, which holds that citizens comply with state authority only when the state fulfills its obligation to provide security and justice. The evidence from Uromi suggests that when this obligation is perceived to be violated, citizens revert to self-help mechanisms such as mob justice. This supports the classical

argument of Hobbesian theory, where the absence of effective authority leads to disorder and informal enforcement. However, critics of this perspective argue that social contract theory may oversimplify complex governance realities by assuming a linear relationship between state failure and social disorder. In reality, informal justice systems can coexist with formal institutions and may even be socially legitimized in certain contexts (Baker, 2002).

Procedural justice theory further deepens the interpretation of the findings by emphasizing the role of perceived fairness, transparency, and respect in shaping institutional legitimacy. The study confirms Tyler's (2006) argument that when citizens perceive legal authorities as fair and responsive, they are more likely to comply with formal legal systems and less likely to support extrajudicial actions. The strong negative relationship between trust in institutions and mob justice supports this view. However, some scholars have critiqued procedural justice theory for overemphasizing perceptions at the expense of structural realities such as poverty, inequality, and systemic violence (Bradford et al., 2014). In the context of Uromi, structural insecurity and limited police presence may also independently contribute to mob justice, beyond perceptions of fairness alone.

The study also reveals the dual role of community security structures in shaping mob justice outcomes. On one hand, neighborhood watch systems were found to reduce mob justice by promoting preventive surveillance and early intervention. This supports existing literature that views structured community policing as a complementary mechanism to formal law enforcement (Akinlabi, 2017). On the other hand, vigilante groups were found to increase the likelihood of mob justice, reflecting concerns raised by Baker (2002), who documents how vigilante groups in Nigeria often evolve from protective bodies into coercive and sometimes violent actors. This duality is also reflected in broader African literature. Tankebe (2013) shows that in Ghana, community-based security groups can enhance perceived safety when properly regulated but may undermine rule of law when accountability is weak. Similarly, Meagher (2007) argues that vigilante groups in Nigeria operate within a "hybrid governance space" where they both fill security gaps and reproduce violence. The findings from Uromi therefore reinforce a critical insight in the literature: informal security structures are not inherently positive or negative but are shaped by the strength or weakness of regulatory oversight and state integration. The results suggest that mob justice in Uromi cannot be explained by a single factor. Rather, it emerges from the interaction of institutional failure, legitimacy deficits, and the ambiguous role of community-based security systems. This supports a more nuanced understanding in the literature that moves beyond simple state-versus-society explanations toward a hybrid governance framework, where formal and informal systems coexist in complex and sometimes contradictory ways.

7. CONCLUSION

This study concludes that mob justice in Uromi is driven by a complex interaction of weak institutional capacity, low public trust in formal security agencies, and the growing reliance on informal community security structures. The empirical evidence shows that when state institutions fail to respond effectively to crime or are perceived as untrustworthy, citizens are more likely to resort to extrajudicial forms of justice. Importantly, the study demonstrates that mob justice should not be interpreted solely as criminal or deviant behavior. Rather, it reflects a deeper governance problem rooted in the inability of the state to fulfill its core responsibility of providing timely, fair,

and effective justice. In this sense, mob justice represents a symptom of weakened state legitimacy and a breakdown in the social contract between citizens and government.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of this study, several policy recommendations are proposed to reduce the incidence of mob justice in Uromi and similar communities.

- 1) There is a need to strengthen community policing frameworks by improving collaboration between the police and local communities. This will enhance intelligence sharing, improve response times, and rebuild public confidence in formal security institutions.
- 2) The judicial system should be reformed to improve efficiency and reduce case delays. Faster adjudication of criminal cases will strengthen deterrence and reduce the perception that offenders escape justice, which often fuels mob action.
- 3) Vigilante groups should be formally regulated through clear legal and institutional frameworks. This will ensure accountability, reduce abuse of power, and clearly define the boundaries between community security and unlawful violence.
- 4) There is a need to enhance police accountability and transparency mechanisms. Addressing corruption, misconduct, and abuse within law enforcement will significantly improve public trust and compliance with legal processes.
- 5) Civic education on the rule of law should be intensified to sensitize citizens on the dangers of mob justice and the importance of due process. This will help shift public attitudes away from extrajudicial responses toward formal justice mechanisms.

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